And they had better document every step in the development process.
As so many clients do, Sentia ignored counsel's advice and hired Alsharabati to do the work. And she did so in the record time of six weeks.
DII claimed the software is identical to the EU Model and sued for breach of contract, misappropriation of trade secrets and other theories not of interest to us here.
Litigation
So far so good. But then DII got sloppy in the discovery process and failed to identify its trade secrets with specificity or differentiate them from what is public knowledge. Sentia asked for sanctions, so DII scrambled about and identified its entire source code (i.e., mathematical equations) as a total compilation that was the big trade secret and twelve major components that were each secrets as well. Sentia huffed and puffed about that, and DII was ordered to produce "all algorithms, block flow diagrams, narratives" associated with the development of EU Model. And Sentia was awarded attorney's fees for its efforts in acquiring this information.
DII said the software was over fifteen years old and they didn't have the algorithms. Reverse engineering would cost in the range of $100,000. The magistrate judge brought them all in again and said if the stuff didn't exist, then it didn't. And imposed sanctions of $13,256.25.
Ouch. Sentia moved for summary judgment based on the failure of DII to meet the burden of establishing trade secrets. Sentia won this, and DII appealed.
The Appeal -Trade Secrets
The state of Virginia defines a "trade secret" as "information including but not limited to a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique or process, that:
1. Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and 655, 664 (4th Cir. 1993) .
Thus the whole secrecy issue is fact-intensive and very much a jury question. Hoechst Diafoil Co. v. Nan Ya Plastics Corp., 174 F.3d 411, 419 (4th Cir. 1999) . DII said its software is a compilation within which there are twelve specific functions, any or all of which are protected trade secrets. Which -see the requirements above -is a complex question of fact. The Fourth Circuit agreed and remanded to the district court.
Trade Secret Nondisclosure
Abdollahian and others signed agreements not to disclose DII's proprietary information. They assigned work product to DII and agreed to return all confidential stuff when they left. The district court basically ignored this saying there was no evidence of breach because there was no evidence of any trade secrets.
Since the Fourth Circuit had sent the trade secret issue back for a jury trial, then this was reversed as well.
Kugler had never executed his nondisclosure agreement but a letter from him to DII stated he would never make improper use of confidential information. DII said they would never have shared anything with him without such an understanding.
The absence of a writing does not mean there was no binding agreement. It is a question of intent. If the parties have a meeting of the minds -and part of the understanding was that a written contract would be executed -then "…there results an obligatory contract which neither party is at liberty to repudiate. If the brief is for the state as a party to the litigation, and the brief is prepared by attorneys who are state employees, the brief is likely to be a government document, so the answer as to whether it is copyrighted or not will depend on whether the state claims copyright in its documents. If, however, the brief is one written by a private attorney for a private party to the litigation, then the brief may well be copyrighted. Some attorneys and law firms do claim copyright in their briefs and are particularly unhappy with services such as Lexis and Westlaw which sell copies of their briefs.
To my knowledge, there are no cases on this issue, and the legal authorities seem to say only that there may be copyright in briefs. Another possibility, of course, is that in filing the brief with a court, that brief becomes public domain as a part of the court record, but this does not appear to be a very strong argument. Public domain is certainly the best argument from an open government type argument, however. But consider the following. A song writer has not published a particular song, but it is introduced into evidence in a court in a case concerning the ownership of the copyright. Clearly, introduction of the song into evidence in court does not make that song public domain. Analogizing to briefs would mean that they do not become public domain just because they are filed in court. Unfortunately, this is one area where there is no clear answer.
QUESTION: A teacher in a nonprofit educational institution music therapy program is interested in the use of sheet music and printed scores in that program and asks whether fair use, the Teach Act or other statutes and regulations apply. What are the guidelines for students who routinely download sheet music to learn and bring into lessons and music therapy clinical sessions?
ANSWER: If these music therapy sessions are for teaching students to be music therapists, then the Guidelines on the Educational Use of Music apply. They are available at: http:// www.unc.edu/~unclng/music-guidelines.htm. The guidelines cover both the reproduction of music recordings as well as sheet music for educational purposes but for study not for performance. General fair use also applies. For performance and display of nondramatic music in a face-to-face classroom, the section 110(1) exception applies and permits the performance if the purpose is for instruction and the other conditions are met. If the class is a transmitted or online class, then the TEACH Act permits the performance. Neither of these sections apply to reproducing sheet music though. If the music is to be performed, it is a good idea to ask students to make sure that they examine the copyright notice on the sheet music on the Web and make sure that there is no restriction on downloading for performance. When librarians have contacted Amazon to request clarification, the answers received are not clear. As the library lending of Kindles becomes more prevalent, it is likely that the license agreement will be redrafted to deal with this type of use. Online license agreements that are clearly written and easily located on a Website tend to be upheld by courts. Further, a library would be considered to have more knowledge than an individual user might, so the license agreement is more likely to be upheld.
QUESTION:
A recent Library Journal (http://www. libraryjournal.com/article/CA6649814.html) article pointed out the mixed messages that Amazon has provided on this matter. At this point, however, with the online license not mentioning lending of the devices, there appears to be no reason that a library could not lend Kindles to users.
QUESTION: Can a touchscreen smartboard be used for story time in a public library?
ANSWER: As phrased, this is a technology question and not a copyright one. Use of the technology itself presents no problems on the copyright front. However, if one reproduces works to be displayed on the smartboard, then the same issues are present as with photocopying or with displaying images. If the question contemplates displaying all of the words of the story on the screen to help with reading and/or including the illustrations, this is reproducing an entire work and probably is infringement. If permission is sought from the publisher, it is likely that permission would be granted. 
Non-competition Clause
Efird entered into an agreement to not compete with DII's "precise" business for a period of two years. Virginia law examines these contracts on a basis of (1) limiting the scope to what is reasonably necessary to protect legitimate business interests of the employer, and (2) These covenants are not favored as they are restraints on trade and are strictly construed against the employer including putting the burden of proof of reasonableness on him. See Grant v. Carotek, 737 F.2d 410, 411-412 (4th Cir. 1984) .
The district court found the agreement was "broader than necessary" to protect DII's legitimate interests. But this was premised upon the belief that DII had no trade secrets. "The possession of trade secrets and confidential information is an important consideration in testing the reasonableness of a restriction on competition." Meissel v. Finley, 198 Va. 577, 
